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Coevolution Is Everywhere
Coevolution is: Examples in political science:
Networks Behavior
Peer groups 
 Political behavior
Cosponsorship 
 Legislative behavior
Party coalitions 
 Manifesto content
Alliances 
 Conflict behavior
Coevolution and Multiple Steady States
What about the long-run characteristics of systems with coevolution?
• Consider a longitudinal process where N actors choose behavior in each time
period t.
• Define state (roughly) by the set of outcome-behaviors of all the actors.
• We can define the equilibrium of the system as the steady-state distribution of
N actors’ types.
I Our goal (1): Establish theoretically that systems with coevolution can more
easily generate multiple equilibria than systems without coevolution.
(Due to violation of assumptions for the Ergodic Theorm.)
I Our goal (1’): Establish theoretically that systems with coevolution are more
likely history-dependent than systems without coevolution.
History Dependence
Rigorous definitions of “history matters".
• 3 Types of History-Dependent processes (Page 2006):
1. State dependence: the outcome at t depends only on the currently ob-
servable state, implying Markov processes.
2. “Phat" dependence: the outcome at t depends on the past states (his-
tory) but the order of past states doesn’t matter.
3. Path dependence: the outcome at t depends on the past states and the
sequence of the past states.
I Our goal (2): Assess the empirical significance of coevolutionary political dy-
namics.
I Our goal (3): Develop an empirical strategy to estimate and evaluate history-
dependence, merging the theoretical and empirical models of coevolution.
Theoretical Model (Type-Interaction)
Purpose of the Theoretical Model
• A simple model to derive conditions under which systems have multiple equilib-
ria.
• As stated in Page (2007), the potential for multiple equilibria is important:
1. The set of conditions for multiple equilibria is a reasonable measure of
systemic complexity.
2. Allows us to analyze how initial/past states affect the attainment of one of
the equilibria. = A simple model of phat/path-dependent processes.
Type-Interaction Model
Difference Equations and Equilibria(
at+1 bt+1
)
=
(
at bt
)( z1 1− z1
z2 1− z2
)
,
where z’s are polynomials of a and b.
⇒ Multiple steady-states (where at+1 = at and bt+1 = bt) for a and b.
Take-Away Points (Theory)
Key Finding & Claim
• With coevolution, a very simple type-interaction model (with deterministic out-
come rules) can generate multiple equilibria.
• If the coevolutionary dynamic exist in given data (= an empirical question), then
the system is most likely phat/path-dependent, b/c the type-switching probabili-
ties are changing over time.
Comparison with Page (2007)’s "Rule of Six"
• Page derives, in his non-coevolutionary interaction model, that at least 3 types
are necessary for a system of 3 actors to have multiple equilibria, if the outcome-
rules are deterministic. Hence the “rule of six" (3+3).
• We show that, with coevolution, multiple equilibria arise even with 2 types, 3 ac-
tors, and deterministic outcome rules. Hence a “rule of less-than-six"–showing
the level of complexity.
Where to Go with This?
• An important and difficult empirical question arises;
To what extent does history matter?–How sensitive are equilibrium distribu-
tions to the past states?)
Our Statistical Model (Spatial-Logit + P-Star)
[ Discrete-Time Markov Model ]
• To explain the behavioral-type switching, a simple spatial-logit model
Pr(typei,t = 1) = logit(β0 + β1typei,t−1 + β2W · typet−1).
• To explain the tie-formation, a simple p-star model (independent dyads)
Pr(tiedyad−i,t = 1) = logit(γ0 + γ1tiedyad−i,t−1 + γ2I(type matcht)),
where I(type matcht) indicates whether the types in the given dyad were the same in the
previous period. The term captures “homophily".
⇒ Estimated βˆ2 and γˆ2 indicate the existence of coevolutionary dynamics.
NB: SIENA (Snijders et al.) = Continuous-time Markov model.
Application
Alliances and the Conflict Behavior of Major Powers (1900-1950)
[Markov Model] Discrete-Time (MATLAB) Cont.-Time (SIENA)
Ours Snijders et al.
Alliance MIDs Alliance MIDs
Networks Behavior Networks Behavior
Temp lag 4.93∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27)
Previous MIDs -0.51∗ -3.52∗∗∗
similarity (0.27) (0.60)
Previous 0.85∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗
Alliance tie (0.31) (0.53)
Loglikelihood -237.4 -179.5
• (1) Evidence of heterophily–pacific powers are more likely to ally with aggressive
powers, and (2) conflict behavior diffuses through alliances.
Take-Away Points (Empirical Strategy)
• The combined spatial-logit and p-star (ERGM) model provides a relatively sim-
ple way to assess the empirical significance of coevolutionary dynamics.
• The combined spatial-logit and p-star (ERGM) model is directly related to the
theoretical Markov interaction model.
⇒ This connection is crucial to analyze empirically history dependence.
• Connecting theory and empirics would be much more difficult in a continuous
-time framework.
Empirical Analyses of History Dependence
Next Steps
• Short Run: To add stochastic outcome rules to the theoretical model in form
conducive to generating the statistical model.
• Medium Run: To theorize more fully the relationship between multiple equilibria
and history dependence.
• Long Run: To develop statistical tests for various types for history dependence,
including path dependence.
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